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Introduction: The Impact of Kelo v. City of New London on
Eminent Domain
John G. Sprankling*
When the Supreme Court held in Kelo v. City of New London' that a family
home could be condemned and then conveyed to a private enterprise as part of an
economic redevelopment project, protests erupted across the nation. Why?
For centuries, the governmental power to take private property has been seen
as an essential element of sovereignty. The Fifth Amendment imposes two
constraints on this inherent power. Private property may be taken only for
"public use" and upon payment of "just compensation., 2 Nineteenth-century
courts interpreted the Public Use Clause as requiring the government or the
public to physically use the property being taken; this "physical use" standard
turned on the identity of the user.
But the twentieth century presented new social and economic challenges. As
suburbs expanded with the post-World War II boom, the downtown areas of
many large cities began to decay. The idea of "slum clearance" gained
popularity: local government would develop an urban renewal plan, condemn
land in blighted areas, and resell the property to private entrepreneurs who would
construct new housing, businesses, and other projects consistent with the plan.
The 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker3 signaled the Supreme Court's shift
to a new standard for defining "public use." There, a business owner asserted that
the condemnation of his non-blighted store as part of a redevelopment project in
the District of Columbia did not meet the public use standard because it was
merely a "taking from one businessman for the benefit of another
businessman" 4-a taking of private property for purely private use. But the Court
rejected this claim, reasoning that the public use requirement was met because
the land was taken for a legitimate public purpose: improving the quality of
housing. In its decisions after Berman, the Court continued to use this "public
purpose" standard to define the scope of "public use."
Kelo raised a novel question: can government, consistent with the public use
requirement, condemn a non-blighted, owner-occupied home as part of a city-
approved economic revitalization project? By a five to four majority, the Court
found that the plan "unquestionably serves a public purpose"5 because it would
provide new jobs, increase tax revenue, and generally revive the depressed
downtown area of New London, Connecticut. Refusing to second-guess the
wisdom of the city council's approval, the majority opinion stressed the need to
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defer to local legislative judgments. Thus, for the majority, the decision was a
logical application of the Court's modem public purpose jurisprudence.
But the decision sparked sharp dissents from Justices O'Connor and Thomas.
Justice O'Connor argued that the majority had misinterpreted Berman and its
progeny by creating a new test that expanded the meaning of "public use" and
threatened all private property rights: "The specter of condemnation hangs over
all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a
Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory. 6 In
turn, Justice Thomas complained that the "public purpose" approach-from
Berman forward-violated both the most natural reading of the Public Use
Clause and the intent of the Framers. In effect, he advocated a return to the
historic "physical use" standard.
Kelo ignited a firestorm of public outrage-probably the most negative
response to any Supreme Court decision in recent years. Polls showed that more
than seventy percent of Americans in various states disagreed with the decision,7
regardless of political affiliation; Democrats, Republicans, and independents all
opposed Kelo with equal fervor.8 As a result, legislation to limit the Kelo holding
was quickly adopted by most states and by the federal government.
What explains this remarkable public outcry? The home has always occupied
a special place in our legal culture. Just as the Third and Fourth Amendments
ensure privacy inside the home, the law has specially protected the home in many
other situations.9 As the Supreme Court observed in a 1980 decision, "the State's
interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society."' Consistent with
this tradition, Americans generally expect that the law will safeguard their family
homes.
Kelo shocked the nation because it highlighted an unpleasant reality: under
some circumstances, the government may seize a home despite the owner's
objections. Across the country, millions of Americans worried that their own
homes might be taken. The theoretical risk of eminent domain-a vague concept
to most citizens-had suddenly become disturbingly real. In addition, ideological
opposition appeared from both ends of the political spectrum. Conservatives
viewed the decision as the most significant attack on private property rights in
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decades; liberals saw it as a major threat to traditional privacy rights within the
home."
Over the last two years, Kelo has generated continuing debate among
lawyers, law professors, and judges, as reflected in a number of law review
articles.'2 The three pieces in this collection offer helpful perspectives that will
enrich this ongoing discussion.
First, David L. Breau provides the first comprehensive analysis of Justice
Thomas' Kelo dissent. This article is particularly valuable because Thomas is the
foremost advocate of the historic "physical use" standard, which he views as
reflecting the Framers' original intent. Accordingly, Breau considers the validity
of Thomas' textual analysis of the phrase "for public use," which is based on
citations to a founding-era dictionary and other sources; explores Thomas' use of
Blackstone as common law background; and questions Thomas' review of early
eminent domain practices of the states. Ultimately, Breau rejects Thomas' view,
finding that the Framers' intent was unclear.
Moving from the merits of the Kelo decision to potential responses, Elisabeth
Sperow argues that increased political accountability is the remedy for abuse of
the eminent domain power. Characterizing Kelo as a decision that reflects careful
judicial restraint, not judicial activism, her article suggests that members of the
public should participate more actively in the political processes leading to
redevelopment approvals and other activities that give rise to eminent domain.
Ultimately, elected representatives who make improper legislative judgments
should be held accountable at the ballot box.
Finally, the Comment by Dale Orthner examines another possible response to
Kelo: increasing the amount of compensation paid to homeowners. He argues
that payment of fair market value does not provide full compensation, in part
because a home has non-economic value to its owner. Increasing the required
compensation to 150% of fair market value, he suggests, would both discourage
government from abusing the eminent domain power and reduce the incentive of
homeowners to challenge condemnations.
It is still too early to assess the legacy of Kelo. The decision may prove to be
merely a step in the evolution of the public purpose test. Or it may be a
transitional case that leads to a new public use standard. At this point, one can
only predict that Kelo will remain controversial. The collection of articles that
follows will shed new light on that controversy.
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